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Wanting Freedom* 
 
 
“to be free is not merely to cast off one’s chains, but to live in a way that 
respects and enhances the freedom of others.” 
 
-Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom 
 
I. Do we want freedom? 
On first hearing, asking whether human beings want freedom seems like a silly question. 
Of course we want freedom! Patrick Henry’s cry, “Give me liberty or give me death,” is a 
sentiment has been echoed by every succeeding generation of warriors, patriots, and resisters. But 
the actions of contemporary Americans (who are surely not alone in this) often belie this 
sentiment. Collectively, at least through our government’s actions, we seek safety through greater 
government control over our actions and we condone human rights violations in the name of 
security.1 As private individuals, we often constrain our actions or reactions in the name of 
getting along, not rocking the boat, or respecting tradition.2 We accept something less than our 
vision of the good for ourselves or others out of selfishness, fear, peer pressure, or resignation. 
We seem to want freedom only if it is easy to get.  
What is it, then, to want freedom? First note the ambiguity with the word “want”: Am I 
asking whether we lack freedom or whether we desire it? I suggest that these are related issues; 
lacking freedom reduces the desire for freedom, although having a desire for freedom does not 
guarantee a path to it. Freedom is, on the account I shall pursue here, a hard won human 
achievement, and desiring or valuing such freedom is an essential part of the achievement. 
Second, what do I mean by freedom? I will argue that we should distinguish four types of human 
freedom beginning with metaphysical freedom – the idea that despite living in a deterministic 
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world there is freedom to act.  I am not primarily concerned here with the metaphysical freedom 
of the will, although I shall assume enough freedom, at least a compatibilist notion of 
metaphysical freedom, to allow for the question I am interested in off the ground.3 The second 
type of freedom is political freedom, which I define as the ability to pursue a wide variety of 
ways of life without coercive intervention by government. This is the sort of freedom Patrick 
Henry was demanding. For my purposes I will simply assume that such freedom is a pre-requisite 
for fully achieving the freedoms that I am interested in here; although that is not an 
uncontroversial assumption, it is not my aim to defend that claim here. I am primarily concerned 
with two other types of freedom: individual, moral freedom, which I will also call “autonomy,” 
and social freedom, as well as the linkages between these two.  By “autonomy” I mean, roughly, 
the internal ability of individuals to act in accordance with desires and beliefs that are their own 
and to choose and follow their own plan of life.  By “social freedom” I mean, roughly, the social 
conditions that allow and support individual autonomy.  
This paper is about the connection between moral and social freedom, and the ways in 
which they mutually reinforce and support each other or are incompatible with each other. My 
thesis is that if we want autonomy (in the broad and rich sense of self-development and creative 
enrichment that I shall argue for) then we ought to want social freedom (in the sense of 
supportive, anti-oppressive, mutually liberating social arrangements), and we ought to want both. 
For any of us to be free, in the sense of autonomy, we must come to desire and work toward 
social conditions that support autonomy for all. The problem is that we are easily led not to desire 
freedom, either in the sense of autonomy or social freedom. I maintain that the taste of freedom in 
each sense generates an appetite for more freedom in both senses. Hence, if we are to be free we 
must choose that path which generates the desire for these rich types of freedom. 
 
II. Conceptions of freedom 
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Philosophical thought about freedom offers many different, complex conceptions. Gerald 
MacCallum’s analysis of freedom as a triadic concept is a good place to start any discussion of 
freedom because of its simplicity. On his account there is only one concept of freedom, and it is 
to be analyzed thus: 
x is (is not) free from y to do (not do, become, not become) z,  
[where] x ranges over agents, y ranges over such “preventing conditions” as constraints, 
restrictions, interferences, and barriers, and z ranges over actions or conditions of 
character or circumstance.4 
On this analysis, only human subjects can be free, and they are free to do or become something 
(z) only when they are free from interferences or preventing conditions (y). Freedom on this 
account relates a subject to an end he pursues and the means he takes to pursue it. The analysis is 
inclusive, in that it reconciles competing accounts of positive and negative freedom under one 
concept, in which the fundamental kind of unfreedom is interference. MacCallum’s relational 
analysis of freedom allows for freedom to be violated either by externally imposed interferences 
with one’s freedom, such as being stopped from enjoying a Sunday stroll by a mugger, or lacking 
sufficient support, such as being unable to enjoy the Sunday stroll because of one’s lack of a pair 
of shoes (owing to social conditions).  
 MacCallum’s triadic analysis of freedom is well suited as a concept of freedom of action 
on the metaphysical assumption that both free and unfree acts are possible for human subjects. 
The analysis highlights the relation between the subject’s ends and her capability to act. Although 
this univocal account of freedom is elegant and clear in its focus on interference, there are 
combinations of ways of forming ends and ways that one can be able or unable to act that can be 
usefully distinguished. One’s ends can be one’s own, others’ ends, or ends that one has but that 
would not be endorsed on reflection (such as from an addiction). One’s ability to act can be 
interfered with by outside forces that are human or non-human in origin, or one can be unable to 
act because of a lack of natural ability or a lack of social support. However, we may not wish to 
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say that all of these ends, interferences, and inabilities are essentially connected with freedom. 
These distinctions allow us to separate three types of human of freedom and different conceptions 
of each within the triadic analysis of the concept of freedom. 
First consider the matter of ends. A conception of moral freedom answers questions about 
what qualities a person’s will or motivation has to have in order for an action or a character to be 
judged as morally acceptable, worthy, or good (or not). Was that act the agent’s “own”? Was she 
helped or caused to do it by some force external to her will? Did she intend and plan the action? 
What aspect of her character motivated it? A Kantian conception of moral freedom claims that a 
free agent’s acts should be framed by the moral law and enacted by the agent’s own desire to be 
in conformity with the law.5 A contractarian conception of moral freedom claims that an agent’s 
actions should be constrained maximization of her preference satisfaction subject to the ability of 
other cooperators to likewise achieve constrained maximization of their preferences.  More recent 
discussions of autonomy have centered on questions about whether the agent was under the 
influence of adaptive preferences or deformed desires.6 Theorists of autonomy differ over 
whether there are substantive conditions on the kinds of desires that motivate free acts, and what 
procedural accounts of reasons and motivations characterize autonomous actions.7 
Next consider how internal and external impediments matter for freedom. A conception 
of social freedom, I propose, concerns the freedom from impediments provided by a group for its 
members. Such a conception answers questions about what a society or a group of persons owes 
to each other by virtue of being in certain relations which that conception considers morally 
valuable. Is everyone in society owed a certain basic minimum outcome, or just a framework 
within which individuals can operate and cooperate? What are the limits of support that we owe 
each other as members of the same family, community, or state, or because of our common 
humanity? A communitarian conception of social freedom would be one that is based in the ties 
of community.8 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights can be seen as offering a conception 
of social freedom based in the common humanity of persons. It begins with the phrase, “Whereas 
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recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,”9 and goes on to 
enumerate a list of positive and negative rights that secure this freedom. In Article 28 the social 
order is held responsible for ensuring these rights and freedoms. One important kind of social 
impediment that conceptions of social freedom consider is oppression. Different conceptions of 
social freedom will disagree on what counts as oppression, but most theorists of freedom will 
agree that it is a kind of unfreedom. Yet oppression is a form of unfreedom not as easily 
recognized by conceptions of moral freedom, which focus on individual ends and harms.  
Social freedom is distinct from political freedom in that the latter concerns the coercive 
powers of government vis-à-vis individuals, while the former concerns relations between any 
groups of persons with morally valuable relations among them and the individuals that make 
them up. Political freedom can thus be considered a form of social freedom, under the assumption 
that there are morally valuable political relations. It is worthwhile keeping the social distinct from 
the political, however, because formal, legal restrictions backed by a coercive power is a very 
distinctive form of constraint on action, and requires legitimation in ways that social groups 
generally do not. Conceptions of political freedom recognize forms of oppression that originate 
from governments’ impediments to or failures of support for individual autonomy, but they may 
not recognize forms of oppression suffered by social groups as a result of legal though harmful 
traditions and behaviors that constrain individuals. Social freedom highlights these social 
impediments to individual autonomy. 
While modern, liberal political philosophers characteristically offer conceptions of 
political freedom, they do not always offer conceptions of social freedom. Mill, as I shall argue, is 
an exception. We could also single out Rousseau for a particularly misogynistic vision of social 
freedom, in which women are to be raised to serve men so that they, the men, can collectively 
enact a general will.10 Female and feminist writers have typically been more concerned with 
social freedom than most liberal political philosophers. This is understandable given the fact that 
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women, until recent times, have been excluded from the formal, political realm, though they have 
been full partners in or even dominated limited social realms. Modern female philosophers like 
Mary Wollstonecraft and Mary Astell argued for education as the route to female social freedom, 
if not political equality.11 In the mid-twentieth century Simone de Beauvoir posed a vision of 
social freedom as enabling everyone to escape the confines of immanence, to achieve an 
authentic, transcendent life.12 In contemporary philosophy, feminist philosophers have often been 
more concerned with equality than with freedom, but there are important exceptions. Drucilla 
Cornell’s vision of social freedom is one in which sexual freedom allows persons to imagine and 
re-imagine their erotic lives.13 Carol Gould’s project of rethinking democracy attempts to satisfy 
both ideals by offering a conception of social freedom as self-development constrained by the 
requirement that persons have an equal right to social provision of the conditions of self-
development.14 
Philosophers may offer a conception of one of these two types of freedom (moral and 
social) without being much interested in the other. However, particular conceptions of moral 
freedom are compatible, that is, mutually achievable, only with certain conceptions of social 
freedom. For example, a conception of moral freedom that requires non-interference with 
individuals is incompatible with a conception of social freedom that holds that freedom consists 
in shared ties of tradition and obedience to social hierarchy. Therefore, philosophers interested in 
moral freedom should attend to the conception of social freedom that is implied by the 
widespread achievement of their conception of moral freedom, and vice versa. If we desire both 
moral and social freedom, as I shall argue we should, then we must embrace conceptions of 
freedom that are compatible with each other.  
 
III. Varieties of (moral and social) freedom worth wanting 
There are some types of moral and social freedom that are not worth wanting.  Feminist 
and Marxist thought has helped us to see that there is a kind of hyper-masculine, aloof 
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independence that we should not celebrate or foster in our children. We definitely don’t want to 
see it in others. This type of moral freedom celebrates choice without constraint, and creates a 
character that has been called the possessive individualist,15 characterized by the attempt to live 
free of essential economic, social, or moral ties to others.  The possessive individualist is the self-
interested egotist, who does not need anyone else to support him in any way, and who in turn 
does not feel the responsibility to offer support except on his own selfish terms. Admittedly, the 
virtuous possessive individualist may have his good points, for himself and for others. In good 
times he does not ask for other people’s money or care; he resents paying taxes, but cheerfully 
offers gifts; he generously supports causes that he believes in; and he is loyal to his family and 
friends. He takes pride in his ability to care for himself and chosen others, and he thinks of 
himself as having made it to his position of independence by his own efforts. The possessive 
individualist’s political philosophy of freedom is libertarianism and he believes that he and others 
should be left alone by government, which should exist only to protect his property.  Social 
projects should be completely voluntary; no one in need deserves a share of his hard earned 
wealth.  The possessive individualist is willing to fund a police force and a defensive army to 
protect the wealth of the nation’s individuals, but the sense he gives to “wealth” is impoverished.  
It comprises only the goods that one can see as goods here and now (though this may indeed be 
an extensive list).  It does not include education or development of new sensibilities for art, 
culture, or morality if those are not on the wish list of the ones who can pay for them.  
 The good point about this notion of freedom as independence is the emphasis on 
individuals having choices. Freedom must afford individuals choices. But I have three objections 
to the possessive individualist variety of freedom. First, possessive individualism does not value 
social connection in itself because it has a mistaken ontology of the self.16 The result is that it is a 
self-undermining value system. Social connection is at the heart of what we are. Our families and 
communities provide the structure within which we understand the world through the language, 
institutions, and social norms they provide for us. Although we no doubt respond to these 
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structures in individual and unique ways, our reactions make sense only within and through the 
senses that these structures allow. To put it another way, our choices only become choices rather 
than just random behaviors through the meanings that social structures provide. 17 Social 
institutions are always already there; we then take them and make our individual contributions to 
them to alter them for our collective future, but we are not subjects without them. 
Second, as a result of this mistaken ontology of the self, the possessive individualist 
pursues a sub-optimal strategy of living. All of us can enjoy belonging and feeling loved by a 
family and a community.  Yet, we can also alienate these feelings from ourselves to some degree 
by creating norms of individualism that create more isolating spaces for each other, and 
rewarding individuals for meeting them. We can form our more or less local social norms to 
accentuate greed, self-interest, winning at all costs, and individual status attainment. But this is 
not an optimal strategy for anyone to pursue for a lifetime, and not for most of us even in the 
short run. We all start off, and many of us end up, unable to win contests for goods or status. 
Dependence is a basic fact of human life at least in the beginning and often in the end and at 
points in the middle, and we all need to cultivate connections to each other if we want to be able 
to depend on others when we need them.18 As we mature, our aims and desires change to include 
others’ good, as well. Love of family and friends consists in taking their good to be our own. 
Even if we think that the good is to be measured by how much our current desires are satisfied, 
the strategy of pursuing the possessive individualist good at the cost of social connection is self-
undermining. It causes individuals to compete for and seek out their individual good, rather than 
looking for opportunities for cooperation for mutual advantage.19 Thus by failing to value social 
connection for its own sake, possessive individualists fail to create a community in which there 
are opportunities for cooperation to seek each individual’s good. Now the possessive individualist 
will say, “but I reciprocate benefits to those who benefit me; all others I take advantage of or 
ignore.” But at best this works only if one’s life never turns out to need others to act toward one 
without thought of reciprocal benefit. One cannot assume that will happen; such a life is 
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extremely rare and usually ends suddenly. Given our enormous uncertainty about the future, this 
strategy is too risky to be rational. Furthermore, such a life would be one without love, and so not 
reasonable to wish for. At worst this instrumental, exploitative attitude towards strangers is 
infectious, mutual trust disappears, and social life degenerates into a series of prisoner’s 
dilemmas. 
My third objection to this sense of freedom is that it is paired with a faulty conception of 
social freedom, which I will call “libertarian liberty.” This conception of social freedom assigns 
very few responsibilities to individuals, and they are nearly all negative duties to refrain from 
interfering with others. The exceptions to this are the limited duties to contribute to collective 
defense and collective enforcement of negative duties.20 Libertarian liberty holds the possessive 
individual to be its ideal person. It does not recognize the full value of social connection, namely 
the constitutive aspects of social connection, and so it assigns no responsibility for social 
provision of goods which must be collectively provided.21  This has two bad results. First, the 
unlucky are not cared for or provided for. This is another self-undermining feature of this view of 
freedom, if we have even a minimal aversion to risk, since most of us will need care at some 
point in our adult lives, and many of us will not be able to command it with our wealth alone. 
Further, we are even more likely to have friends or loved ones who need care that we cannot 
command, since the larger the number of people we consider the more likely at least one will be 
in need.  The second bad result is that it is likely that women will suffer disproportionately from 
the care deficit, and this is unfair.22 Women tend to be caregivers because they have been 
acculturated to take care of the children, the sick, and the elderly. A libertarian society of 
possessive individualists will blame women for their perverse preference for taking care of people 
(even while they appear to praise them) and it will continue to exploit them. 
Not only do these varieties of freedom, possessive individualism and libertarian liberty, 
lead to injustice, they are also impoverished by their sense of the good. The good is subjectively 
determined in these theories by each solitary individual, and is not up for discussion or dispute – 
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it is a subjective welfarist theory of the good. Individuals see no compelling motive to compare 
their preferences to some objective standard or make an intersubjective comparison, and so no 
way for a society to pursue any collective goods, other than unanimously agreed upon protection 
of their individual wealth. But this sense of the good stagnates without any challenges from 
outside the individual. The possessive individualist does not seek outside opinions about 
goodness; any change or improvement in his sensibilities comes haphazardly if at all. Yet, we 
know that it is possible to cultivate our desires and preferences in ways that will improve them. 
We can educate our desires in a variety of ways, aesthetic, cognitive, and moral, so that we want 
better things, and things that ultimately make us better off by our own lights.  Conceptions of 
moral and social freedom that recognize this aspect of what we can aspire to and achieve would 
be worth wanting. 
John Stuart Mill is famous for his work on liberty, yet he also encouraged cultivation of 
the good life through education and self-development. Mill agrees with other utilitarians that 
overall happiness or pleasure is the highest good, but he holds that pleasures differ not only in 
quantity but also in quality, and that the cultivated pleasures outrank the uncultivated ones. 
Through education and proper moral and social upbringing, we learn to take pleasure in pursuits 
that exercise our higher order capacities for intellectual activity, creativity, imagination, 
sympathy, and other types of emotional connection.  
Mill holds that we can determine what counts as a higher quality of pleasure by seeking 
the advice of competent judges, who are people who have been educated to appreciate these 
various sorts of pleasures and can rank pleasures by their quality.  Mill is thus in one sense an 
elitist about pleasure, since he thinks that we need to have attained a certain elite level of 
education in order to appreciate all of the truly pleasurable experiences human life has to offer.  
But this elitism is mitigated by the fact that his philosophical system that produces this elitism 
also supplies an argument for ensuring that everyone is so educated.  He argues that everyone can 
learn to appreciate higher order pleasures.23  Since educating everyone to this point will increase 
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pleasure in the world, and utilitarianism requires us to maximize pleasure, we should work for a 
world where everyone is educated enough to achieve this level of development. Once children 
have reached this level, the requirement on society to educate is fulfilled on Mill’s view. 
Our development continues beyond this point, however, through our own efforts at self-
development.  By self-development Mill means the experiences we choose to engage ourselves in 
to exercise our capacities and make new associations of our pleasures with our capacities, our 
creations, and our social connections.  Self-development creates new kinds and qualities of 
pleasure for us, but it risks bringing failure and unhappiness.  We also risk criticism from others 
or even social sanctions if we behave in new and different ways.  Different individuals will have 
different levels of tolerance for the amount of risk they are willing to undertake for new 
experiences.  Those who take more risks and reach out to the edges of their capacities are 
performing “experiments in living” which we can all learn and benefit from.  Hence, he argues, 
we should allow each other the freedom to develop ourselves without social sanction, provided 
that we are not harming others directly by violating their rights.  So individuals’ choices are very 
important for Mill, but they need to be choices from an educated, informed, and socially 
connected set of options, free of the psychological effects of oppressive socialization, to earn the 
name “liberty”.24 
This account of Mill’s argument for the liberty principle implies two lessons for the thesis 
I am defending.  First, the freedom to develop one’s capacities in accordance with our desires, 
without social sanction, and on the foundation of a thorough intellectual, moral, social, and 
physical education is the kind of moral freedom worth wanting.  This is the freedom that I will 
term “autonomy”, and describe in short as free self-development. 25 A Millian perspective on 
autonomy is thus largely procedural in that it comes through educated capacities for choosing, but 
it is not entirely content-neutral in that higher-order pleasures are to be preferred by autonomous 
persons to lower-order ones.26  
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Autonomy on this description is worth wanting because it is pleasure-seeking and it is 
progressive: it promotes psychological changes in the individual that track both pleasure and 
social connections. It avoids the self-undermining problem of possessive individualism by 
promoting social connection and thus cooperation. And while pleasure-seeking, it is not 
reductive; the way it counsels us to seek pleasure is by exercising our developed capacities as we 
choose (provided that we do not harm others).  These capacities include the capacity for forming 
and enhancing social connections, and hence this form of autonomy is not socially isolating. 
Second, Mill’s argument entails that we will have a collective obligation to provide for 
the education of the next generation because children are at that stage where they need to be 
taught to develop their capacities if they are to be autonomous adults.  Since that is the way that 
more and higher quality pleasure is created, we are obligated on a utilitarian view to provide the 
education.27 I am not a utilitarian, but I do think that other moral and political theories can 
generate this obligation, as well.  For example, a contractarian can argue that by educating 
children in this way we provide more and better opportunities for cooperation for mutual 
advantage.  A Kantian can simply argue that it is the only way to treat children as ends in 
themselves. With this full-bodied description of autonomy as free self-development, we can 
generate a moral imperative to provide a full, effective education for children on any reasonable 
moral theory.28   
I have so far concentrated on the positive goods and efforts that need to be provided to 
children to allow them to achieve autonomy as they mature. I have said little about the restrictions 
and constraints that need to be removed, and little about what we need to provide for adults. 
These are connected needs; for most adults, what they need to have had is good education and the 
freedom from constraint to continue their development. Freedom from these constraints requires 
freedom from oppression. Autonomy requires an absence of oppressive social constraints that 
prevent free self-development. Systematic violence, economic discrimination and segregation, 
social shaming, vicious stereotyping, are among the most autonomy-defeating forces because of 
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the way that they tend to stunt a person’s psychological growth. Victims of violence or of 
economic or psychological oppression tend to withdraw and narrow their sights, and such 
narrowing is not consistent with development.29 The arguments for providing education for 
children would equally show that these forces must be prevented and removed. Thus, Mill’s 
argument for liberty, which appeals to each to encourage self-development in others, is also an 
argument for what I have termed “social freedom,” and describe in short as the social conditions 
that allow and support individual autonomy for all. 
Despite the argument that autonomy and social freedom are worth wanting, we see a 
world in which social freedom does not yet exist, and there are great obstacles to individual 
autonomy. Even those who are free from oppression are often unable or unwilling to exercise 
their autonomy. Although Mill’s argument provides an abstract and general reason for why 
autonomy is worth wanting, it does not seem to effectively speak to each of us to pursue a life of 
self-development. It is a further task to demonstrate that, even if we do want autonomy as 
individuals, we should want social freedom. With our conceptions of moral and social freedom 
now defined, the problem of wanting freedom can be seen as twofold: (1) to demonstrate why 
each of us should want autonomy, and then (2) to demonstrate why we should want social 
freedom, the social conditions necessary for each of us to be autonomous. 
 
IV. Why should each of us want to be autonomous? 
 Let’s take the first task: to demonstrate why each of us should want to be autonomous.  
This is a live question only for those who are not yet autonomous, since those who are can see 
that autonomy is worth wanting.  So what I need to do is ask why someone who is not yet 
autonomous should want to be. Why would someone doubt the value of autonomy as free self-
development?  The answer depends on what sort of freedom one currently has or lacks.  One 
person who doubts the value of autonomy is the possessive individualist.  Recall that he wants to 
get his good as he now sees it; he does not want our care and concern, nor does he want to give it 
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to others.  He does not want to develop his capacities for unknown future pleasures, but simply to 
seek pleasure as he conceives it now.  His pleasure might include that of some others close to 
him, but beyond that he is not interested in social freedom, that is, in working to bring about the 
conditions that will enhance the autonomy of others. In fact, he might prefer it if everyone else 
seeks to satisfy his desires rather than their own.  
Earlier I argued that the possessive individualist undermines his own project of 
maximizing satisfactions of his desires by making cooperation with others rare and difficult. As 
long as there are many possessive individualists, it will be difficult for them to observe the 
benefits that others get from being cooperative. If there are models of cooperative, autonomous 
individuals, then possessive individualists, seeing cooperators succeed on the possessive 
individualists’ terms, will choose to alter their approaches to others and begin to choose 
cooperation. At that point they will see that it is in their interest to be surrounded with 
autonomous others, since these are the persons who freely develop themselves and so have much 
to offer as fellow cooperators. With even larger numbers, they can begin to alter the social 
landscape to support the development of others who can be autonomous with some additional 
social support beyond the normal care and concern they enjoy. 
One might object that once the autonomous person has become an adult with the 
capacities for self-development, they would be tempted to become the possessive individualist. 
Why should such a person remain a cooperative, autonomous person who upholds social 
freedom?30 I think that there are two answers to this question. First, the autonomous person has 
developed the capacities for cooperation and the desire to live among others who are also free, 
self-developing individuals. Such attitudes will not be easy to shake loose, provided that they are 
mirrored in many others around them. There will be social norms for expression and behavior that 
will tend to reinforce these attitudes. Are these norms constraining norms? Yes, but not 
oppressively so, given the second point, which is that being a cooperator is at least not irrational 
given the vicissitudes of mortal life. Cooperative behavior will tend to encourage reciprocity from 
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others. But being a possessive individualist will tend to bring only grudging service when one 
needs help, if one can pay for it. Social norms that reinforce what is rational to choose given the 
natural facts of human life are themselves rational constraints, and so not oppressive. Once one is 
an autonomous person, in a community of autonomous persons with social freedom, it would not 
be rational to make oneself into a possessive individual. In a society of mostly possessive 
individualists upholding libertarian liberty, this would not be a persuasive argument, however. A 
second answer, admittedly less persuasive, is that autonomous persons are seeking to develop 
their higher order capacities, their excellence as human beings, rather than merely satisfying their 
currently held desires. What is needed is a critical mass of autonomous persons who can set a 
model for others and create the social norms that reinforce cooperative attitudes. If this is 
achieved, then I believe that social freedom is self-sustaining. 
Another category of non-autonomous persons who need to be convinced are those 
oppressed persons who are not actively resisting their oppression. Elsewhere I have argued that 
the most puzzling feature of oppression is its endurance: when any group of us could rise up to 
resist oppression, why do we find some groups oppressed for generations? 31 The short answer is 
that the oppressed themselves are co-opted into joining into their own oppression.  This happens 
in a variety of ways through self-destructive psychological mechanisms, such as shame and low 
self-esteem, and accepting stereotypical descriptions and then appropriating those images into 
one’s own self-concept. Conditions of material and economic oppression often cause women and 
cultural or racial minorities feel shame and lowered self-esteem.  Feeling shame and lowered self-
esteem then drains one of confidence and assertiveness, which handicaps one’s ability to plan, 
and causes one to narrow one’s view of what one can hope to be. Thus, shame and low self-
esteem turn inward on the oppressed. Trauma brought on by systematic violence can cause people 
to rehearse and re-enact the traumatic circumstances in order to try to gain some control over 
painful thoughts.  Oppression is thus internalized; the psychology of oppression becomes like an 
auto-immune disease where the victims’ bodies turn against themselves.   
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Victims of oppression are also co-opted into acting in ways that further their own 
oppression. When an oppressed person faces limited opportunities they naturally try to make the 
best of a bad lot. So, for example, when faced with serious and interconnected social obstacles to 
getting a better education, we take the best job that is currently available rather than seeking ways 
around the obstacles. When women face serious obstacles to securing good child care options, 
they often accept part time work rather than asking the fathers of their children to compromise 
their career interests.  But this leaves these women with poorer human capital, the skills and 
experience to seek better jobs in the future, and reinforces stereotypes of women as unpaid 
domestic workers.32   
The multi-generational nature of many forms of oppression magnifies the problem by 
creating a stubbornly lasting image of the oppressed as inferior and unworthy of equal concern. 
Women have been seen as having a natural place beneath and behind men, literally and 
metaphorically, that both men and women find difficult to erase from their imagination, even if 
consciously they want to see them as equal. So women are somewhat more reluctant to speak in 
public than men.33 And at the same time the women who do speak out are often branded as shrill 
or whining by both men and women.34 This is old news, of course, but the problem persists, 
despite our recognition of it and the desire that many of us--male and female--have to change it. 
Old habits of thought and prejudice die hard. In this and many other ways, oppressed persons are 
co-opted psychologically and economically into reinforcing their own oppression. Individual 
strategies for change do not seem to work. Seeking political solutions to these obstacles is often 
even more problematic for individuals, particularly those who face multiple forces of oppression, 
since that requires collective action which is time consuming, expensive, and often requires 
special skills that most of us do not possess.  
These indirect psychological and economic forces of oppression lead many of the 
oppressed not to resist oppression and thus to live lives of lesser freedom in either sense of moral 
freedom that I have discussed.  They are neither free in the limited sense of the possessive 
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individualist, since they lack a full range of choices that are available to non-oppressed persons.  
They may not even have the ability to seek out their best interest even as they currently calculate 
that.  Nor are they free in the sense of autonomy as free self-development, since they are unable 
or unwilling to develop their capacities and take risks or make experiments in living.   
 Fighting indirect forces of oppression, which work internally within the psychology and 
behaviors of the oppressed themselves is, I believe, an even more difficult task than fighting 
direct forces that are applied from outside.  Direct forces are injustices that, when made manifest, 
can be made rallying points for collective action.  Indirect forces appear to be choices made by 
the oppressed. These choices are no better than the choices of the possessive individualist. While 
he chooses with his immediate best interest in sight, the oppressed person who is co-opted 
chooses for her long-term worst interest -- she actually chooses with a view to maintaining the 
forces that oppress her, though she may not see it that way.  Opposing oppression then raises a 
sort of moral dilemma: if the oppressed are making choices, then is that not a manifestation of 
their freedom? If the oppressed are prevented from so choosing, would that not be a further cause 
of their oppression? So the problem of wanting freedom becomes: how can the oppressed be 
motivated to want free self-development rather than the best of a bad set of options (which her 
choice itself reinforces)? The problem is that in trying to motivate people to want something other 
than what they now choose, we seem to have to replace their choice with our judgment.  
 Autonomy requires free self-development; social freedom requires that we empower each 
other to achieve autonomy. But it is a practical problem to transition from passively (or actively) 
accepting the internal impediments of oppression to living autonomously. Other moral and 
psychological principles can play a role in determining the best path to achieve autonomy.  In 
order to minimize harm and develop the psychology of autonomy, we should first make social, 
institutional changes that do not directly confront or violate anyone’s rights and increase freedom 
to choose in hopes that by giving people better options they will increasingly demand more 
freedom to develop their capacities.35 Educational institutions will play an enormous role here: 
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seeing to it that every child and young person develops their basic capacities to read, write, think 
critically and imaginatively, and to have sympathy and concern for others. An education for free 
self-development should include vivid models of how traditional barriers have been overcome 
and new ranges of choice open to individuals. Then we must trust that the psychological pleasures 
of self-development will become manifest, and will lead people to self-develop in ways that do 
not further the oppression of their social groups or others’. This is not to say that we should not 
continue to engage in dialogue with one another about ways of life that seem deformed or 
depraved by formerly oppressive circumstances. However, our uncertainty about what the best 
life is for any particular person must constrain us from choosing for others among ways of life, 
provided they obey the harm principle. 
  
V. Social freedom: the “third concept” of freedom  
While many philosophers recognize negative and positive freedoms in similar ways, third 
concepts of freedom have been proposed by different philosophers in quite different ways.36 
Isaiah Berlin discussed and rejected a third sense of freedom that he finds in the claims of 
colonial oppressed persons,37 and which emerged in the writings of philosophers writing about 
colonial oppression, such as Jean-Paul Sartre or Frantz Fanon. This form of freedom, defended as 
well by Cynthia Willet, is the fulfilled desire for sociality and belonging within one’s group, and 
recognition of one’s social group and their distinctive values and norms from outsiders.38 She 
calls this third form of freedom, “solidarity.” Willett’s third freedom as solidarity requires the 
existence of social bonds that are binding enough to tie the individuals beyond their ability to 
resist and set themselves free. On her view this is because the oppressed must have strong social 
bonds to support and provide an alternative source of social norms and meanings through which 
members of their group can achieve self-esteem. 
I also want to resist the notion that this is a form of freedom, regardless of the good social 
bonds might bring.  Consider again MacCallum’s triadic analysis of freedom: “x is (is not) free 
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from y to do (not do, become, not become) z,” [where] x ranges over agents, y ranges over such 
“preventing conditions” as constraints, restrictions, interferences, and barriers, and z ranges over 
actions or conditions of character or circumstance. Social bonds of solidarity are something that 
one can be free from, but that does not fit into this analysis as a contribution to freedom. 
Furthermore, they are not a characteristic end that subjects desire. Subjects may well desire the 
by-products of social bonds: empowerment, love, inclusion, solidarity.  But it is a conflation of 
means and ends to suggest that the bonds themselves are desired. Indeed, social bonds are the 
very forces of unfreedom in many cases. Consider the oppressive forces of social bonds on 
women, which require them to confine themselves to domestic life on pain of social ostracism. It 
is true that bonds of solidarity both enable and constrain. The first, enabling, is part of positive 
freedom, but the second, constraint, is not any part of freedom; it is the dark, exclusionary side of 
solidarity. Why, then, should we conceptually align social bonds with freedom? Empowerment 
surely is important for escaping constraint and thus for achieving freedom, but it is not the same 
thing as freedom. Communal norms which empower can assist us to become autonomous, but 
they also bring along constraining aspects that can thwart autonomy. Freedom must therefore sit 
in tension with those norms. 
In my view we want freedom in order to pursue or reject social bonds that help us to 
freely self-develop – not to be dominated or threatened with constraints by others who would 
prevent our ability to pursue or imagine them. This latter danger is most acute for members of 
social groups that have been oppressed for generations. Such persons have a constrained vision of 
what is possible for them, and need to be able to see beyond these constraints that have been 
erected by others but reinforced internally.  
Nonetheless, a third form of freedom can emerge under the right circumstances, namely 
the social conditions which allow and support individual autonomy for each person, which I call 
social freedom. Social freedom is institutional, not tribal or based on personal connection or 
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affiliation. It is based in the potential for cooperation across ties of affection and kin, and our 
ability – an ability that is admittedly only nascent in the human tribe -- to transcend enmity, 
prejudice, and parochialism. It is the cosmopolitan third concept of liberty. Social freedom as I 
construe it is a conception of freedom that fits MacCallum’s triadic analysis. Under conditions of 
social freedom we can say that the following obtains for each individual: Subject x is (socially 
supported to be) free from oppression (y) to self-develop (z). Oppression is the main preventing 
condition that social freedom eliminates, and free self-development is the characteristic end the 
subject achieves. But social bonds that constrain rather than empower are another form of 
constraint that social freedom rejects. 
Social freedom transcends positive freedom by considering the needs of each as members 
of social groups, not just of individuals one at a time. Autonomy requires an absence of 
oppressive social constraints that prevent free self-development. Social freedom provides the 
background conditions under which individuals can seek their mutual advantage without 
dominating each other or binding each other in a suffocating hold. This is true of the society of 
free persons, which is not only free of current oppression, but whose members seek to free all 
persons from oppression by critically questioning and reformulating traditions.  For in such a 
society the individuals are able to seek their own good with good will toward others as well. They 
seek to encourage diversity and enhance the freedom of others. They take pleasure in and 
recognize how they benefit from the accomplishments of others. And further, they come to see 
their own freedom as connected to that of the others.  
 
VI. Wanting social freedom 
In examining how oppression happens and how it maintains itself through generations, I 
have assumed that each of us generally plans our lives and chooses our actions with our interests 
in the short- to medium-term. Yet, if freedom is to be possible, it will be necessary for at least 
some persons to look beyond their short- to medium-term interests and work toward a 
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transformation of society that may be costly over that horizon. What would motivate persons to 
do this?  
At the very least, a philosopher should offer a rational argument that would appeal to 
persons to work toward these ends. I want to offer an argument for the claim that the freedom of 
all is required for the freedom of each, which I take to be an argument for my thesis, that the price 
of autonomy is social freedom, and then conclude with an example of how social freedom can 
appeal to each. This claim may seem problematic in two ways.  First, it appears to conflict with 
the idea that a primary reason that persons, both privileged and oppressed, participate in 
oppressive social institutions is because it is in their interest to do so. The conflict in this case is 
merely apparent. One’s long-term interest can conflict with one’s short- to medium-term interest, 
with the latter motivating behavior. Indeed, that is one way of explaining the existence of 
weakness of will. Second, it may appear problematic in that it is utopian to think that we can 
reach freedom. The argument I will give, though, shows how we can appeal to the short term 
interests that many of us have to build gradually to the social freedom we seek.  
In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls provides the outlines of the argument.  Rawls argues 
that humans tend to obey a basic generalization of psychology, which he calls the Aristotelian 
Principle.  The principle states: “Other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their 
realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the 
capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity.”39  This principle posits a basic motivational 
principle that seems to be borne out by our everyday experiences. As we grow and mature we 
often seek out new challenges, and we take pleasure in developing our capacities to enjoy them.  
Our love of sport, art, craft-making, reading, decorating our homes, cooking food, entertaining 
our friends, and a thousand other occupations and enjoyments testify to the validity of the 
principle. Psychological studies suggest that becoming and being competent at a chosen skill is 
one of the most satisfying aspects of life and contributes to one’s overall happiness more than 
wealth or even popularity.40 The second premise of the argument is supplied by the fact, noted by 
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philosophers from Aristotle to Marx to Rawls that humans are deeply social creatures.  As Rawls 
explains it, “Humans have in fact shared final ends and they value their common institutions as 
good in themselves.  We need one another as partners in ways of life that are engaged in for their 
own sake, and the successes and enjoyments of others are necessary for and complementary to 
our own good.”41 Humans must join and cooperate with others to carry out projects large and 
small. Over time our projects deepen in complexity and nuance. The opportunities and ways of 
life that any individual may choose from are bequeathed by previous generations who themselves 
built upon those they inherited from and built in cooperation with others. In participating in these 
projects our achievements are made possible by the achievements of others. Rawls calls the social 
units that humans form in this way “social unions.”   
The Aristotelian Principle suggests, then, that individuals find pleasure in the 
achievements of their social unions, which also means that they find pleasure in the achievements 
of others in those groups.  At its best, participating in social unions effects a transformation of 
individual psychology that avoids envy and expands our concern for others. Through shared 
activity, we “begin to see ourselves as part of a larger enterprise; our perception of who we are 
and of what we can do expands to cover the activities of others who are fulfilling other parts of 
the overall task.”42 Furthermore, we come to see that by expanding our circle of concern to others 
who were once excluded we can increase our pleasure. 
This idea of finding pleasure in each other’s achievements and coming to identify with 
them proves the value of social freedom. The society of persons living under conditions of social 
freedom, which is not only free of current oppressions but whose members seek to free all 
persons from oppression, exemplifies this admirable virtue of each taking pleasure in the 
achievements, the flourishing, of others. For in such a society the individuals are able to seek 
their own good with good will toward others as well. They take pleasure in, benefit from, and 
identify with the accomplishments of others. And further, they come to see their own freedom as 
connected to that of the others. Thus, they seek to enhance the freedom of others. We can, I 
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believe, take steps toward a free society because we are able to transform ourselves – make 
ourselves better – through good willed participation in social unions that are gradually 
transformed by increasing freedom.  
An example of a social union that promotes social freedom comes from the work of the 
Grameen Bank. The Grameen Bank provides small loans to poor women in Bangladesh to allow 
them to develop small businesses that support their families. These women borrow enough to buy 
a pot or a stove to make and sell chapattis on the street, or a cell phone to become their village’s 
telephone ladies, or a cart to sell their handmade goods on the streets. The borrowers come to 
have a stake in the bank’s success, and in this way they have a stake in each other’s success. The 
Bank has been tremendously successful on several measures: 68% of its borrowers have crossed 
over the poverty line; it is self-financing; it has generated over a dozen specialized firms; many of 
its women members have been elected to political office; its founder won the Nobel Peace Prize 
in 2006.43 The Grameen Bank example shows that even on a small scale, people can use market-
based institutions to better their own lives and engage in mutually advantageous interactions with 
others. The Bank has increased the freedom of women in Bangladesh by providing the possibility 
for them to take out loans, albeit small ones, that enable them to earn a living, send their 
daughters to school, and resist the traditional norms that have kept women and men in destitution 
and ignorance. The commerce that is generated transforms lives through the profits but also 
through the appreciation of anonymous others’ efforts to make the market work for all.  
Grameen has expanded to several different enterprises, from communication to yogurt, 
all with the end of achieving freedom from poverty for the sellers and supplying freedom 
enhancing goods for the buyers. Thus it exemplifies an institutional framework that allows 
individuals to develop their capacities through free interaction that improves well-being and 
empowers the autonomy of others. It is a social union and an example of social freedom among 
its stakeholders. And it is an example of how persons can be motivated to engage with unknown 
others in ways that support their autonomy. 
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In enjoying the achievements of others, we experience freedom from what Marx called 
the alienation of man from man. We gain valuable information about alternative ways of life that 
others pursue with interest and devotion. This in turn develops our own capacities, our imaginary 
domains, which allow each of us the psychic space to enhance our freedom and take pleasure in 
it. In learning the value of diversity and tolerance, we become motivated to end oppression and 
unearned privilege, both our own and others’. This transformation is not easy; it requires moral 
character to resist the enticements of privilege or accommodation. Like autonomy, social freedom 
is a hard won achievement that comes about only when we really want and work for it. But at 
least we can see that it is rational and humanly possible to seek the freedom of others – even 
those who we do not know but whose social cooperation with us is even potentially valuable – 
along with our own.  
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